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China p e r s p e c t i v e sSpecial feature
Editorial
SÉBASTIEN COLIN
The multiple tensions that have existed in the China Seas since thelate 2000s, manifested in the inflexibility of narratives relating to sov-ereign rights or in provocations and skirmishes at sea, have made it
necessary to analyse more thoroughly the maritime and foreign policies of
the states involved. These analyses are even more important now that
power relations are being expressed with more force in the South China Sea
as well as the East China Sea in recent years. This is borne out by the firmer
action taken by states, such as China’s construction of civilian and military
infrastructure in the Spratlys, Japan’s nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands in September 2012, and the arbitration proceedings initiated by the
Philippines in January 2013. More recently, between October 2015 and May
2016, the United States held three Freedom of Navigation Operations
(FONOP), indicating that apart from territorial disputes between neigh-
bouring countries, the geopolitical situation in the China Seas is primarily
the result of the Sino-American strategic rivalry.
Without aiming to be comprehensive, this special feature studies some
aspects of China’s policy towards the China Seas. (1) It complements an al-
ready rich literature that is difficult to summarise here due to the multi-
sectoral and multidisciplinary nature of the analysed theme. This special
feature, consisting of this introduction and four articles by Mathieu Duchâ-
tel, Shinji Yamaguchi, Benoît de Tréglodé, and Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix,
attempts to explain the main recent developments in China’s policy toward
the China Seas, to identify its goals, and to understand its determinants. 
The Chinese policy toward the China Seas fits within the dual context of
a more ambitious foreign policy seeking to influence the world order
through the transformation of some norms and the creation of new insti-
tutions, (2) and of a domestic policy aimed at building a genuine maritime
power. Gestating since the 1990s, this objective to assert China’s power on
the seas, either through the modernisation of the Navy or the development
of the marine economy, was presented as a priority at the launch of the
12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) and the 18th Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) in November 2012.
China’s overall policy toward the China Seas is a complex policy with four
main objectives: the first is to claim islands and maritime areas; the second
is to strengthen its control over the China Seas in order to more effectively
defend its coasts and maritime routes; the third is to assert its power in the
context of its strategic rivalry with Japan and the United States; and the
fourth is to develop the exploitation of natural resources to meet the needs
of its population and its economy. These multiple objectives give free rein
to the various and sometimes contradictory initiatives oscillating between
firmness, provocation, dialogue, and cooperation, a range that also is ex-
plained by the many factors relating to the geography of the China Seas,
historical heritages, and the evolution of external and internal policies in
China, in neighbouring countries, and in the United States.
Domination or sharing?
Analysis of China’s policy toward the China Seas begins with the consid-
eration of geography. Unlike the United States, bordered by two vast oceans,
China is riparian to three semi-enclosed seas: the Yellow Sea, the East China
Sea, and the South China Sea, beyond which lies a peninsular and island arc
shared by nine states (see Map 1). This geography is important, because
combined with the current US military presence in South Korea, Japan, and
the Pacific, and various strategic partnerships forged by Washington with
Taiwan, the Philippines, and Singapore, this deepens China’s sense of  ”en-
circlement,” the reality of which is not really in doubt: firstly because it is a
device largely inherited from the Cold War; and secondly because one of
the main objectives of the United States since the end of the Cold War has
been to counter China’s ambitions in the China Seas and beyond. (3) From
this perspective, we can highlight the impact of the loss of Taiwan, which
has twice deprived China of a direct opening to the Pacific.
The result of this geography is a Chinese spatialisation of maritime space
characterised by the jinhai近海, which brings together the China Seas, and
the dayang大洋, which corresponds to the maritime areas located beyond
the “island chain.” This spatialisation is at the heart of the redefinition of
maritime strategy proposed by Admiral Liu Huaqing in the 1980s, the ob-
jective of which, as recalled by Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix in his text, was
to develop a navy capable of operating within this island chain before any
consideration of broadening its scope to the dayang.
This geography also has important implications for the way the Chinese
authorities are mobilising the various maritime delimitation principles es-
tablished by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNC-
LOS), which China signed in 1982 and ratified in 1996. In the case of
semi-enclosed seas where the limits of the exclusive economic zones (EEZs)
of coastal states overlap, Article 74 of UNCLOS advocates seeking “an eq-
uitable solution” by “agreement” or, pending a final settlement, the conclu-
sion of “provisional arrangements of a practical nature.” (4) On this issue,
China’s position varies depending on the maritime area in question. In the
Yellow Sea and East China Sea, while evoking the principle of equity, China
opposes South Korean and Japanese proposals to delimit the maritime
boundaries on the principle of the median line (see Map 2). Against Japan,
Chinese authorities claim the continental shelf, which is geographically to
their advantage, and on that basis submitted, on 14 December 2012, details
1. This special feature corresponds with the publication of oral papers given in the framework of a
seminar series entitled “China and the China Seas: Chinese Maritime Policy and Geopolitical Sit-
uation in the Maritime Spaces of East Asia,” co-organised by the CEFC and Hong Kong Baptist
University (HKBU) from April 2015 to February 2016. As this seminar series received financial
support from the CEFC, the Hong Kong Baptist University, the Fonds d’Alembert of the French In-
stitute (Paris), and the Consulate General of France in Hong Kong and Macau, I wish to thank all
these institutions. I also extend my thanks to my colleague Jean-Pierre Cabestan, professor and
director of the Department of Government and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist Uni-
versity, for his collaboration in organising and animating this seminar series. The program, con-
sisting of six conferences and a final workshop, is available at www.cefc.com.hk/fr/la-recherche/
projets-collectifs/redchina-china-seasred-seminar-series (accessed on 7 September 2016).
2. On this point, see the recent special feature of China Perspectives edited by Jean-Pierre Cabestan:
“What Kind of International Order Does China Want? Between Reformism and Revisionism,” China
Perspectives, No. 2016/2. 
3. See Wen-Lung Laurence Lin, “America’s South China Sea Policy, Strategic Rebalancing and Naval
Diplomacy,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2013, pp. 189-228. 
4. ”UNCLOS, Article 74, Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between States with Opposite
or Adjacent Coasts,” United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1834, No. 31363, 1994, p. 49. The full text
of the Convention is available at www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/
unclos/closindx.htm (accessed on 7 September 2016). 
of their delimitation project (for the northern part of the continental shelf
only) to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) of
the Law of the Sea, sparking a lively, but unsurprising, Japanese reaction. (5)
Facing South Korea, China is stuck between rejecting the median line and
its inability to claim the continental shelf due to the epicontinental nature
of the Yellow Sea. In this context, Beijing has opted with Seoul for a “provi-
sional arrangement of a practical nature” via the delimitation in 2000 of a
common fishery zone (see Map 2).
To date, the only maritime delimitation established by China is located in
the Gulf of Tonkin (see Map 3). It is the result of an agreement signed with
Vietnam, also in 2000, in the wake of the 1999 treaty on their land border
and on the basis of the Sino-French Convention of 1887. This legal heritage,
coupled with the absence of island disputes in the Gulf and the weak strate-
gic nature of the latter, undoubtedly facilitated this single maritime bound-
ary that for a brief time, in the context of the rapprochement between China
and ASEAN, created the illusion of a possible change in China’s posture to-
ward the South China Sea. Sixteen years later, through land reclamation
and constructions of lighthouses, airfields, and other civil and military in-
frastructure carried out in record time in the Spratly Islands, China has de-
veloped, strengthened, and materialised its presence in this space more than
ever. Devoid of restraint, these actions on an unprecedented scale are cer-
tainly questionable in terms of international law, but they have created a
new situation and are probably immovable in the short or medium term.
They are as much the realisation of an inherited geopolitical project, origi-
nally intended to defend the self-proclaimed sovereignty rights in the
Spratly Islands, as the reaction to and anticipation of decisions by the
United States or neighbouring states.
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5. The project of the Chinese submission and the subsequent exchange of Notes Verbales between
China and Japan are available at www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
submission_chn_63_2012.htm (accessed on 8 September 2016). 
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A brief overview of the chronology of Chinese initiatives in the South
China Sea reflects the existence of a long-term strategy. Having inherited
the “U-shaped line” (see Map 3) and territorial claims gradually built during
the Republican period, the Communist authorities officially reaffirmed the
South China Sea Islands as Chinese territory in September 1958 as part of
their “Declaration on the Territorial Sea,” (6) and again in February 1992 with
the promulgation of the “Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone.” (7) Since May 2009 and the joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia
on the limits of their continental shelves, verbal notes sent by the Chinese
authorities to the Secretary General of the United Nations and recalling
Chinese sovereignty over the islands have multiplied. In the case of the oil
rig HYSY981, cited by Shinji Yamaguchi in his article, the arbitration pro-
ceedings initiated by the Philippines and Chinese constructions in the
Spratlys were particularly conducive to this increase. These various official
claims were reinforced by coups and annexations in 1974 (Battle of the
Paracels), 1988 (skirmish over the Johnson South Reef), 1994-1995 (annex-
ation of Mischief Reef), and 2012 (takeover of Scarborough shoal). In this
context, it is difficult not to see the recent developments as a logical and
additional step toward increasing presence in the archipelago, strengthening
control over the surrounding maritime areas, and working toward integra-
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6. “Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea (Approved
by the 100th Session of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 4th Sep-
tember, 1958),” printed in Peking Review, No. 28, 9 September 1958, p. 21. 
7. “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (Adopted
at the 24th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress of
the People’s Republic of China on February 25, 1992),” Beijing, Legislative Affairs Commission of
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China,
1992. The official text is available online on the Law of the Sea website: www.un.org/
Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf (accessed on 8 September
2016). 
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tion of a border region by fait accompli. Official support and subsidies re-
ceived by Hainan fishermen recruited into maritime militias to fish in the
disputed areas, (8) as well as the desire to maintain a human presence and
develop cruise tourism in the Paracels (9) in the wake of the establishment of
Sansha Municipality in 2012, are in my view part and parcel of this strategy.
In the East China Sea, Beijing’s claim on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands came
later. Officially expressed in December 1971, it actually duplicated the claim
made several months earlier by Taiwan, which the PRC had just replaced on
the UN Security Council. Although newer and post-1949, we again find
something like a legacy of the Kuomintang. Clearly mentioned as territory
belonging to China in the Law of 1992 but not in the 1958 Declaration, the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands subsequently became subject to ongoing tensions
between China and Japan. When the Japanese government announced the
“nationalisation” (10) of the islands in September 2012, the Chinese author-
ities established baselines around them before submitting coordinates to
the United Nations. (11) A little more than a year later, in November 2013,
Beijing defined an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering the is-
lands and almost all of the East China Sea (see Map 2).
By these recent actions, as Mathieu Duchâtel points out in his text,
China especially seeks to undermine Japan’s administration over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and to develop, through the multiplication of mil-
itary and civilian patrols, a more regular presence in the entire disputed
maritime area. Since the establishment of the ADIZ, these patrols are not
only maritime but also, increasingly, airborne, a reminder that the air
forces of the People’s Liberation Army are now an important actor. In
short, China’s policy in the East China Sea is, in the words of Mathieu
Duchâtel, a “policy of open confrontation” motivated by “a quest for po-
litical and territorial gain” and therefore ready “to accept a certain degree
of risk.” This policy, which also applies to the South China Sea, could seek
a status quo, but only if it is likely to freeze a situation generally
favourable to China’s interests.
Reaction, anticipation
If this long-term strategy aimed at maintaining claims and defending
territorial integrity constitutes a framework within which Chinese actions
evolve, other factors undoubtedly demonstrate some initiatives that have
been taken. This is where the relationship between the actors – whether
in the maritime domain and/or in foreign policy, in China or in other coun-
tries affected by the disputes – becomes important, as well as political
undertakings by neighbouring countries and other existing rivalries and
power relations with Japan and the United States. Thus, to cite a few ex-
amples, the “Declaration on the Territorial Sea” of September 1958 was
also a protest by China vis-à-vis the Convention of the Law of the Sea
signed in Geneva a few months earlier. Similarly, while China had not es-
tablished baselines around the Senkaku/Diaoyu upon its ratification of
the Law of the Sea in 1996, the decision of September 2012 was clearly
a reaction to/anticipation of the purchase of the islands by the Japanese
government.
The extension of the ADIZ beyond the territorial sea that took place a
year later did not appear, however, to be a direct response to this “nation-
alisation.” (12) If the new area, including the islands, intends to challenge
Japanese “sovereignty,” its purpose is primarily military. It aims, in the con-
text of the anti-access/area denial strategy evoked by Alexandre Shel-
don-Duplaix in his article, to demonstrate a greater military presence
inside the first islands chain and in this way to show to Japan and the
United States that China has the military capabilities (and confidence) to
control this space. Under consideration since the early 2000s, its materi-
alisation in November 2013 was mainly a response to the changing strate-
gic environment around the East China Sea characterised by reform of the
Japanese Constitution and the deepening of security relations between
Japan and the United States in the context of the American policy of
“Pivot to Asia.” (13) Xi Jinping’s ascent to power and the priority given to
building up China as a sea power could be another factor.
As with the project of the ADIZ, the plan to unify various maritime law
enforcement agencies in favour of the Coast Guard (Zhongguo haijing
中国海警), unveiled in March 2013, (14) had been raised back in the 2000s
during the Hu Jintao era without being brought to fruition . (15) As noted
by Shinji Yamaguchi in his text, the fact that this plan was implemented
after Xi Jinping came to power testifies to Xi’s strong influence on
China’s maritime policy. Despite the difficulties and resistance that can
result from such a reform, the unavoidable divergences and interests of
different maritime players do not seem to be jeopardising China’s overall
policy toward the China Seas. Shinji Yamaguchi, like other observers, (16)
sees a greater centralisation of decisions and better coordination among
maritime actors in recent years under the auspices of a stronger power
eager to realise one of its policy priorities. Xi Jinping’s visit to the marine
militia of Tanmen in Hainan in the month following his enthronement
as China’s paramount leader could also be a sign of this will toward co-
ordination. (17)
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Finally, although doubts remain as to the actual date on which they were
launched, the reclamation work and other construction in the Spratly Islands
were probably facilitated and accelerated by the decision of the Philippines
to resort to arbitration in January 2013 and by Manila signing the “enhanced
defense cooperation agreement” (EDCA) with the United States on 28 April
2014. (18) Signed again as part of the US “Pivot to Asia” policy, one of the
objectives of which is to rebalance power relations and limit Chinese influ-
ence in Southeast Asia, the EDCA gives the Philippines armed forces access
to US Army troops, ships, and aircraft in some Philippine military bases since
its ratification by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on 28 July 2016. (19)
It is also legitimate to ask whether these constructions were motivated
in anticipation of the arbitration award on the South China Sea, issued by
the Permanent Court of Arbitration on 12 July 2016 and the terms of which
are largely unfavourable to China. In view of important communication that
the Chinese authorities made to the public and to foreign media during pre-
ceding weeks, it is clear that the Chinese government was making plans on
this issue well in advance. (20)
The arbitration award of 12 July 2016: A
future turning point in China’s policy in the
South China Sea?
While these few introductory pages are not intended to provide an in-
depth analysis of the award, it is useful at this point to recall its main con-
clusions, which emphasise that this award is clearly against Chinese
interests. The first conclusion states that there is no legal basis for China to
claim historic rights to water resources located within the U-shaped line.
The second finds that China’s recent actions in the South China Sea (ob-
struction of Philippines fishing and hydrocarbon exploration, large-scale
reclamation work and construction of artificial islands, and failure to regu-
late its own fishing activities) are in violation of many of the principles of
UNCLOS. The third finds that the features occupied by China in the Spratlys
are “rocks” or “low-tide elevations,” thus prohibiting any delimitation of an
EEZ, or even of territorial sea in the case of low-tide elevations. (21)
Not surprisingly, given the position it had taken at the beginning of
the arbitration process, China has firmly opposed this award, not only
in statements to the media, which are generally limited to qualifying
this award as “null and void” and to recalling the “ancient sovereignty”
of China over the islands, but also by the publication of a legal argu-
ment. (22)
The main question that emerges after the publication of this award is to
what extent it will affect (or not) China’s policy in the South China Sea. For
now, the Chinese authorities continue to maintain a strong military pres-
ence (23) and fishermen continue to frequent the disputed areas despite the
risks. (24) The questions about current and future Chinese developments on
Scarborough Shoal do not seem to indicate a change in posture. (25) The
weight of the inheritance, the willingness to build a maritime power, the
influence of the military, and the strategic rivalry with the United States
are all factors that may anchor this inflexibility for the foreseeable future.
In this context, the key to the lull is probably in the hands of neighbouring
countries, especially the Philippines, which following Rodrigo Duterte’s as-
cent to power responded to the first wish of Beijing by accepting the re-
sumption of contacts. The visit to Hong Kong in August 2016 of former
Philippine President Fidel Ramos, known for his pragmatism vis-à-vis China,
seems to constitute a first step. (26)
Exploitation of resources: Room for
cooperation?
Although not fully addressed in this special feature, the exploitation of re-
sources is another key aspect of Chinese policy toward the China Seas. In
the case of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, Article 123 of UNCLOS en-
courages the establishment of coordination or bilateral or multilateral co-
operation in fisheries management, protection of the marine environment,
and scientific research. (27)
Specifically in terms of fishing, the Chinese authorities are not resistant
to compromise and cooperation, as reflected in the three common fishery
zones established in the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Gulf of
Tonkin (see Maps 2 and 3). In general, fishing has always been a subject of
dialogue between China and its neighbours. With Japan and Vietnam, for
example, fisheries agreements were negotiated in the 1950s. Bordered by
countries that are among the world’s largest fish producers and consumers,
and with fish stocks in strong decline since the early 1970s, the China Seas
are under tremendous pressure, indicating that states have a common in-
terest in cooperating in the management of resources. Nevertheless, beyond
the good intentions toward these joint areas, management continually faces
political inertia, as shown by Benoît de Tréglodé in his article on the Gulf of
Tonkin, or as in the case of the East China Sea, is threatened by Sino-Japan-
ese rivalry and the issue of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. (28)
10 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 6 / 3
18. “Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of
the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation,” Official Gazette of the Republic
of the Philippines, 29 April 2014, www.gov.ph/2014/04/29/document-enhanced-defense-coop-
eration-agreement (accessed on 9 September 2016). 
19. “US Seeks Access to Philippine Bases as Part of Asia Pivot,” Sydney Morning Herald, 25 April 2015,
www.smh.com.au/world/us-seeks-access-to-philippine-bases-as-part-of-asia-pivot-20150425-
1mt29i.html (accessed on 9 September 2016); Mark Merueñas, “It’s Final: SC Affirms Legality of
EDCA,” GMA News, 26 July 2016, www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/575113/news/nation/it-
s-final-sc-affirms-legality-of-edca (accessed on 9 September 2016). 
20. In Hong Kong, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised a special press conference for for-
eign media encouraging them to present a “more balanced view” of the arbitration. See Song
Ru’an (Deputy Commissioner), “Remarks at Briefing on South China Sea for Foreign Press in HK,”
Office of the Commissioner of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hong Kong SAR, Hong Kong, 13 May
2016. 
21. Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of
the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China),” The Hague, 12 July 2016, https://pcacases.com/
web/sendAttach/1802 (accessed on 12 July 2016). 
22. Chinese society of international law, The Tribunal’s Award in the “South China Sea Arbitration”
Initiated by the Philippines is Null and Void, Beijing, Law Press, 2016. 
23. Richard A. Bitzinger, “China’s Militarisation of the South China Sea: Creating a Strategic Strait?”,
RSIS Commentary, No. 221, 1 September 2016, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/
rsis /co16221-chinas-militarisation-of-the-south-china-sea-creating-a-strategic-
strait/#.V9Z_1sd8OUc (accessed on 1 September 2016). 
24. Choi Chi-yuk, “Chinese Fishermen Prepare to Return to Disputed Waters of South China Sea,”
South China Morning Post, 16 July 2016, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/arti-
cle/1990387/chinese-fishermen-prepare-return-disputed-waters-south (accessed on 7 September
2016). 
25. Minnie Chan, “If China Builds in Scarborough Shoal, It Would Come ‘after G20 Summit’,” South
China Morning Post, 13 August 2016, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/
article/2003354/if-china-builds-scarborough-shoal-it-would-come-after (accessed on 8 Septem-
ber 2016); AFP, “Philippines Accuses Beijing of Secret Island Building, Releases Photos of Chinese
Boats at Disputed Scarborough Shoal,” South China Morning Post, 7 September 2016,
www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2017130/philippines-accuses-beijing-secret-
island-building-releases (accessed on 7 September 2016).
26. Bong Miquiabas, “Fidel Ramos: Duterte’s Icebreaker in South China Sea Row,” South China Morning
Post, 12 August 2016, www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2002984/fidel-ramos-dutertes-
ice-breaker-south-china-sea-row (accessed on 7 September 2016). 
27. “UNCLOS, Article 123, Cooperation of States Bordering Enclosed or Semi-enclosed Seas,” op. cit., p. 64. 
28. Zou Keyuan, “Sino-Japanese Joint Fishery Management in the East China Sea,” Marine Policy, No.
27, 2003, p. 136; Clive H. Schofield, Ian Townsend-Gault, “Choppy Waters Ahead in ‘a Sea of Peace
Cooperation and Friendship’?: Slow Progress towards the Application of Maritime Joint Develop-
ment to the East China Sea,” Marine Policy, No. 35, 2011, p. 31. 
Special feature
On the domestic level, delimitation of these areas, one of the main ob-
jectives of which is to regulate catches and thus counter overfishing, has
had an impact on China’s inshore and pelagic fishing sectors. Many fisheries
in Guangxi, Hainan, Fujian, and Zhejiang have been forced to reduce their
fleet with significant impact on employment but without eliminating illegal
fishing. Immense and expanding in the Yellow Sea, Chinese illegal fishing is
the main cause of negative perceptions circulating in South Korea about
the common fishery zone. Due to the South Korean coastguard’s inability
to deal with the influx of Chinese trawlers, and despite occasional joint sur-
veillance operations between the two countries, (29) the Yellow Sea is con-
sidered by many South Korean observers to be a sea of lawlessness. (30)
This example is symptomatic of the difficulties that China faces in per-
suading its neighbours to accept its view on the joint development of re-
sources such as fishing or hydrocarbons in the China Seas, perceived rightly
or wrongly by neighbouring countries as a way for China to increase its pres-
ence in the disputed areas and thus to serve the irredentist cause. A major
difficulty in analysing Chinese policy in the China Seas is the sometimes
blurred relationship between the exploitation of resources and political ob-
jectives. If the installation of the CNOOC’s oil rig HYSY981 off the Paracels
in 2014 had a political objective, as Shinji Yamaguchi shows, the actions of
the Chinese fishermen who do not belong to the militias are motivated less
by the desire to defend sovereignty than by food security and economic
imperatives. (31) This complexity is of course exemplified by the role of eco-
nomic actors such as fisheries and oil companies, but also by the role of
coastal provinces, where the maritime economy represents an important
part of their development. Forced to reduce their inshore fishing fleet in
order to fight against overfishing, these provinces now subsidise and develop
fishing in distant waters, indirectly encouraging illegal fishing in neighbour-
ing EEZs and disputed waters. (32)
Despite these difficulties and these different issues, economic cooperation
is more than ever in Chinese eyes the only way to maintain or restore trust
with neighbouring countries. It is therefore no wonder that the Chinese side
proposed a joint exploitation of fishery resources around the Scarborough
Shoal during Fidel Ramos’ visit to Hong Kong. (33) Another illustration of the
ambivalence of this policy is Xi Jinping’s launch of the “21st Century Mar-
itime Silk Road” initiative, which aims to promote economic and cultural
exchanges in Southeast Asia, while reclamation work was underway or
about to be initiated in the Spratly Islands. 
To conclude this introductory analysis, two major characteristics relating
to the situation in the China Seas can be highlighted. The first is that unlike
previous cycles of tension, the current one seems set for a longer duration.
The second is that the US policy of “Pivot to Asia” and the arbitration award
have helped to internationalise the dispute in South China Sea, a trend that
China has always resisted and that now puts the Chinese authorities at the
centre of attention and criticism at a time when they hope to play a grow-
ing role on the international stage.
The four articles that structure this special feature each shed light in their
own way on Chinese policy toward the China Seas. They discuss security is-
sues, actors’ strategies, cooperation, and naval power. 
In the first article, Mathieu Duchâtel focuses on China’s role in negotia-
tions to establish a maritime and air communication mechanism with Japan
in the East China Sea. He stresses that from the Chinese point of view, these
negotiations are primarily a tool for securing foreign policy objectives re-
lated to sovereignty and its power rivalry with Japan rather than to build
security and stability. According to Mathieu Duchâtel, the socialisation of
China to norms aimed at building confidence in the security sphere has
made little progress, while the risk of incidents in the East China Sea is in-
creasing.
In the second article, Shinji Yamaguchi explores the strategies of Chinese
maritime actors in the South China Sea. He wondered whether China’s var-
ious initiatives taken since 2009 are based on a well-coordinated plan or
are merely the consequences of competition between these actors moti-
vated by their own interests. The author defends the first hypothesis by
pointing out that institutional coordination is improving, especially since
Xi Jinping’s rise to power.
A third article by Benoît de Tréglodé relates to Sino-Vietnamese cooper-
ation in the Gulf of Tonkin, which began in 1994 with negotiations over the
delimitation of the maritime boundary and then expanded, following agree-
ments signed in 2000, to fisheries, hydrocarbon exploration, and maritime
security. The author finds the results of these first 16 years of Sino-Viet-
namese cooperation to be quite limited in terms of their realisation. Nev-
ertheless, he believes that for China the interest in cooperation with
Vietnam lies elsewhere, especially as a means for the Chinese authorities
to test new forms of dialogue and to lend credibility to their narratives of
cooperation in the exploitation of resources elsewhere in the South China
Sea. The Gulf of Tonkin seems therefore to serve largely as an experimental
area for China’s maritime policy in Southeast Asia.
Finally, in a fourth article, Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix focuses on China’s
naval power, which has now expanded its field of action beyond the limits
of coastal waters and the China Seas. He cites the modernisation of military
equipment, including aircraft carriers, and new naval missions. According to
him, if China is a naval power, that power is not global. Still centred on the
China Seas, its scope is regional, but nevertheless with strong ambitions and
growing projections into the Pacific and Indian oceans, with the main ob-
jective of deterring US military intervention in a conflict with Taiwan or in
the China Seas, and protecting its maritime trade.
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